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Exploration Program
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. / NASA-JSC
4
NASA’S Exploration Roadmap
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Ares 1-X
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Ares 1-X
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Ares I
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Orion CEV and ISS
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Typical Mission Sequence
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Ares V
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Ares V
Earth Departure Stage with Altair and CEV
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Altair Lunar Lander
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Lunar Mobility
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Lunar Outpost
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Lunar Missions
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Lunar Surface Systems (Mobility)
Pressurized Rover
Preliminary Power Requirements:
Safe, reliable operation
>150 Wh/kg at battery level
~ 500 cycles
Operation Temp: 0 to 30 C
Maintenance-free operation
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Altair Lunar Lander Ascent Module
Preliminary Power Requirements for
Minimum capability (no redundancy):
• Safe, reliable operation
• 14 kWh energy, delivered
• 1.67 kW average and 2 kW peak power
• Mass allocation:  67 kg
• Volume allocation: 45 liters
• 7 hours continuous operation
• 1 cycle
• Operation over 0 – 30 degrees C
• Operation in 0 – 1/6 G
Ascent Stage:  Batteries
(Current baseline is 
Primary Lithium Battery with plan 
to change to rechargeable Li-ion)
Required to provide contingency power
for descent stage and translunar 
insertion; expect peak power growth; 
Rechargeable provides greater ability 
to test before flight.
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Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Suit 
Lunar EVA 2nd Configuration
PLSS: 
Fan, pump, ventilation 
subsystem processor; Heater, 
controllers, and valves
Enhanced Liquid 
Cooling Garment:
• Bio-Med Sensors
Power / Communications, 
Avionics & Informatics (CAI):
• Cmd/Cntrl/Comm Info (C3I)   
Processing 
• Expanded set of suit sensors 
• Advanced Caution & Warning 
• Displays and Productivity 
Enhancements Video:
Suit Camera
Enhanced Helmet Hardware:
• Lighting
• Heads-Up-Display
• Soft Upper Torso (SUT) Integrated Audio
Preliminary Power Requirements:
• Safe, reliable operation
• 1155 Whr energy, delivered
• 145 W average and 233 W peak power
• Mass allocation:  5 kg
• Volume allocation: 1.6 liters
• 8 hour operation per sortie
• 100 cycles (operation every other day for 6 
mos.)
• Operation over 0 – 30 degrees C
Current Suit Batteries:
EMU: 20.5 V; min 26.6 Ah (7 hr EVA), 9A peak, 5 yr, 
<15.5 lbs, 30 cycles
SAFER:42 V; 4.2 Ah (in emergency only)
REBA: 12.5 V, 15 Ah, (7 hr EVA); 5 yr, ~6 lbs
EHIP:6 V, 10.8 Ah; (7 hr EVA); 5 yr, ~1.8 lbs
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Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP)
Energy Storage Battery Development Schedule for 
Constellation
PDR: Preliminary Design Review
CDR: Critical Design Review 
SRR: System Requirements Review
TRL: Technology Readiness Level
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. / NASA-JSC
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Key Performance Parameters for Battery Technology Development
Customer Need Performance 
Parameter
State-of-the-Art Current Value Threshold 
Value
Goal
Safe, reliable 
operation
No fire or flame Instrumentation/control-
lers used to prevent 
unsafe conditions. 
There is no non-
flammable electrolyte in 
SOA
Preliminary results 
indicate a moderate 
reduction in the 
performance with flame 
retardants and non-
flammable electrolytes
Benign cell venting 
without fire or flame and 
reduce the likelihood and 
severity of a fire in the 
event of a thermal 
runaway
Tolerant to electrical and 
thermal abuse such as 
over-temperature, over-
charge, reversal, and 
external short circuit with 
no fire or flame
Specific energy
Lander:
150 – 210 Wh/kg
10 cycles
Rover:
150 – 200 Wh/kg
EVA:
200 – 300 Wh/kg
100 cycles
Battery-level
specific energy*
90 Wh/kg at C/10 & 30 C
83 Wh/kg at C/10 &   0 C
(MER rovers)
130 Wh/kg at C/10 & 30 C
120 Wh/kg at C/10 &   0 C
135 Wh/kg at C/10 & 0 C 
“High-Energy”**
150 Wh/kg at C/10 & 0 C 
“Ultra-High Energy”**
150 Wh/kg at C/10 & 0 C 
“High-Energy”
220 Wh/kg at C/10 & 0 C 
“Ultra-High Energy”
Cell-level specific 
energy
130 Wh/kg at C/10 & 30 C
118 Wh/kg at C/10 &   0 C
150 Wh/kg at C/10 &   0oC 165 Wh/kg at C/10 & 0 C 
“High-Energy”
180 Wh/kg at C/10 & 0 C 
“Ultra-High Energy”
180 Wh/kg at C/10 & 0 C 
“High-Energy”
260 Wh/kg at C/10 & 0 C 
“Ultra-High Energy”
Cathode-level
specific capacity
Li(Li,NiMn)O2
140 – 150 mAh/g typical Li(Li0.17Ni0.25Mn0.58)O2: 
240 mAh/g at C/10 & 25oC
Li(Li0.2Ni0.13Mn0.54Co0.13)O2: 
250 mAh/g at C/10 & 25oC
200 mAh/g at C/10 &   0oC
260 mAh/g at C/10 & 0 C 280 mAh/g at C/10 & 0 C 
Anode-level
specific capacity
320 mAh/g (MCMB) 320 mAh/g MCMB
450 mAh/g Si composite
600 mAh/g at C/10 & 0 C 
with Si composite
1000 mAh/g at C/10  0 C
with Si composite
Energy density
Lander: 311 Wh/l
Rover:   TBD
EVA: 240 – 400 Wh/l
Battery-level
energy density
250 Wh/l n/a 270 Wh/l  “High-Energy”
360 Wh/l  “Ultra-High”
320 Wh/l “High-Energy”
420 Wh/l “Ultra-High”
Cell-level energy 
density
320 Wh/l n/a 385 Wh/l  “High-Energy”
460 Wh/l  “Ultra-High”
390 Wh/l “High-Energy”
530 Wh/l “Ultra-High”
Operating 
environment
0oC to 30oC, Vacuum
Operating 
temperature
-20oC to +40oC -50oC to +40oC 0oC to 30oC 0oC to 30oC
Assumes prismatic cell packaging for threshold values. Goal values include lightweight battery packaging.
*    Battery values are assumed at 100% DOD, discharged at C/10 to 3.0 volts/cell, and at 00C operating conditions
**  ”High-Energy”          = Exploration Technology Development Program cathode with MCMB graphite anode
“Ultra-High Energy” = Exploration Technology Development Program cathode with Silicon composite anode Revised 06/02/2008
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ETDP Li-ion Cell Development
• Component-level goals are being addressed through a 
combination of NASA in-house materials development efforts, NASA 
Research Announcement contracts (NRA), and grants
• Materials developed will be delivered to NASA and screened for 
their electrochemical and thermal performance, and compatibility 
with other candidate cell components
• Other activities funded through NASA can be leveraged – NASA 
Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Program and Innovative 
Partnership Program (IPP)
• Leveraging off other government programs (DOD, DOE) for 
component-level technology
• Leveraging off other venues through Space Act Agreements (SAA) 
that involve partnerships with industry partners such as Exxon; non-
profit organizations such as Underwriters Laboratory (UL), etc.
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. / NASA-JSC
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Safety Component Development
Led by NASA JSC (Judy Jeevarajan)
• Development of internal cell materials (active or inactive) 
designed to improve the inherent safety of the cell
• Functional components designed to shut down cell in 
case of overcharge, over- current, or over-temperature
• Standardize safety test methodologies
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. / NASA-JSC
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Current State for Safety of Li-ion 
Batteries
Although the chemistry is one that can provide very high 
energy density at this time, it is not the safest
• NASA human-rated safety requirement is two-fault 
tolerance to catastrophic failures – leakage of electrolyte 
(toxicity hazard), fire, thermal runaway
Hazards encountered during
• Overcharge/overvoltage
• External shorts
• Repeated overdischarge with subsequent overvoltage 
• High thermal environments
• Internal Shorts
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. / NASA-JSC
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Overcharge of Battery Module
Charge: C/5 
To 4.4 V/Cell
Overcharge limit:
5.5 V/Cell
Thermal runaway 
after 4.8 V/Cell
Highest temp 
Observed before
thermal
runaway: 248 ºC
41S 5P
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Overcharge of Li-ion Cell Module
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Current Separators in Commercial-off-the-Shelf 
Li-ion Cells
Unactivated Separator Activated Separator
Shut-down temperature is very close to temperature at which initiation 
of thermal runaway occurs.
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SafeLyte® Additive (IPP)
C/2 charge and discharge
92 % capacity retained
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. / NASA-JSC
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Composite Thermal Switch (SBIR)
Now: 2009 ETDP NRA (NASA Research Announcement)
Giner Inc.
Development and demonstration of a composite thermal switch for lithium-ion and 
lithium primary batteries to increase the safety of these batteries by an increase in 
resistance at high temperatures.
Coating for Improved Cathode Safety 
(2009 ETDP NRA)
Physical Sciences Inc.
Development and demonstration of a nanomaterial coating over the traditional 
cathode particles to improve performance and safety.
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. / NASA-JSC
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Screening for Internal Shorts
• NASA –JSC uses vibration method for screening 
against cell internal shorts.
• Other methods used that can provide screening 
for internal shorts are X-rays and CT scans.
• NASA-JSC also uses a crush test method for 
determining the tolerance of a cell chemistry 
/design to internal shorts.
• Foresee collaboration with UL in the near future 
to standardize the method for determining 
tolerance of li-ion cells to internal shorts.
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Summary
• Exciting Future Programs ahead for NASA 
• Power is needed for all Exploration vehicles and for the 
missions.
• For long term missions as in Lunar and Mars programs, 
safe, high energy/ultra high energy batteries are required.
• Safety is top priority for human-rated missions
– Two-fault tolerance to catastrophic failures is required for human-
rated safety
• To meet power safety goals - inherent cell safety may be 
required; it can lessen complexity of external protective 
electronics and prevents dependency on hardware that 
may also have limitations.
• Inherent cell safety will eliminate the need to carry out 
screening of all cells (X-rays, vibration, etc.)
J. Jeevarajan, Ph.D. / NASA-JSC
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